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THINK BEFORE YOU SPEAK:
HOLDER V. HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT-THE
TERRORISTS STOLE MY FREEDOM OF SPEECH!
Robert William Canoy, Jr*
I. INTRODUCTION
The first decade of the Twenty-First Century brought with it a height-
ened awareness of global violence. Media outlets flooded the newsstands
and television stations with images and videos of extremists engaging in
violence. Americans now commonly refer to these persons as terrorists
and have labeled their violence as terrorism. Some individuals and groups
engage in terrorism for political reasons while others, perhaps, only out of
a lust for violence. In response to these groups and their acts, countries
vary in their approaches. This Note addresses the American zero-tolerance
method of dealing with terrorism. America's chosen response to terror-
ism-particularly after the attacks of September 11, 2001-likely led Con-
gress to pass 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which was at issue in the case Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project.' Section 2339B, among other things, forbids
Americans from giving "material support or resources" to any group on the
known terrorist list.2 Holder is the United States Supreme Court's opinion
that deals with several constitutional challenges to § 2339B.' This Note ar-
gues that the Holder interpretation of § 2339B, which was intended to ham-
per terrorism, is doing something far more costly-reducing Americans'
right to freedom of speech.'
Three constitutional issues were raised in Holder: arguments that
§ 2339B violated (1) due process, (2) freedom of speech, and (3) freedom
of association.' This Note will focus on the First Amendment aspects of
Holder, with emphasis on freedom of speech.' Therefore, other issues
raised in Holder will be included by summary in Parts I, II, and III, but
Parts IV and V will address only the freedom of speech issues. Part II of
this Note will provide the facts leading up to litigation over § 2339B, and
* Candidate for Doctor of Jurisprudence, May 2012. The author thanks his family for their
support throughout law school, as well as Professor Henkel and Professor Campbell for their insights,
suggestions, and direction on previous drafts of this Note.
1. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2339(B)(a)(1) (2006) (originally enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-32, §303, 110 Stat. 1250). For an in-depth look at 18
U.S.C. § 2339B, see 184 A.L.R. Fed. 545 (2003).
3. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2712-13.
4. Cf Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of
the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1 (2011).
5. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2712-13.
6. For analysis of the foreign policy issues in Holder, see Wadie E. Said, The Material Support
Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86 IND. L.J. 543 (2011).
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Part III will provide a summary of the Supreme Court's analysis and hold-
ing, including the majority and dissenting opinions. Part IV of this Note
will provide a background and overview of First Amendment jurispru-
dence, and Part V will use the background of case law and the Court's
Holder opinion to demonstrate how a statute, which was intended to ham-
per terrorist groups' violence, is having the effect of limiting the freedom of
speech rights of American citizens. This Note argues that Holder creates a
new branch of freedom of speech law, which does not follow existing case
law, and also argues that no deviation from existing precedent was needed.
This Note will also recommend that the Court reevaluate the decision re-
garding the constitutionality of § 2339B, or in the alternative that Congress
revise § 2339B so that terrorism can be combated in another way, without
sacrificing the most fundamental of individual rights-the freedom of
speech.
II. FACTS
The statute at issue in Holder, § 2339B, in part, makes it a federal
crime to "'knowingly provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist organization."" Precisely what constitutes "material support or
resources" is a large issue in Holder. "The authority to designate a [ ] [for-
eign] entity as a 'terrorist organization' rests with the Secretary of State."9
An organization who has been labeled a terrorist group may seek review of
that designation by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia within thirty days of its designation.10
Under these statutes, in 1997, the Secretary of State designated thirty
groups as foreign terrorist organizations, two of which were the Kurdistan
Workers' Party or Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK) and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)." The PKK was founded in 1974 with the
goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state in southeast Turkey,
while the LTTE, founded in 1976, desired to create an independent Tamil
state in Sri Lanka.12 Both groups engage in political and humanitarian ac-
tivities; however, in the court below, the government presented evidence
that both groups have committed numerous terrorist attacks, some of
which harmed American citizens." The LTTE challenged its designation
7. For more on the purpose behind § 2339B, see Adam Tomkins, Criminalizing Support for
Terrorism: A Comparative Perspective, 6 DUKE J. CONsT. L. & PuB. POL'Y 81 (2010).
8. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2712-13.
9. Id. at 2713 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)-(d)(4) (2006)). For cases discussing the constitution-
ality of this designation procedure, see United States v. Rahman, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002);
People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Council of Resis-
tance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001).





THINK BEFORE YOU SPEAK
as a terrorist organization,14 but the designation was upheld by the D.C.
Circuit."
After the designations of the PKK and LTTE as terrorist organiza-
tions, the Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), along with two U.S. Citizens
and six other domestic organizations," filed suit challenging the constitu-
tionality of § 2339B because the HLP wished to provide monetary contri-
butions, legal training, political advocacy, and other tangible aid in support
of the humanitarian and political activities of the PKK and LTTE but could
not for fear of criminal prosecution under § 2339B. 1" At the time this suit
was originally filed, violation of § 2339B carried a criminal punishment of
up to ten years in prison and a possible fine; at that time, § 2339A(b) de-
fined "material support or resources" "as currency or other financial secur-
ities, financial services, lodging, training, safe-houses, false documentation
or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets,
[with the] except[ion of] medicine [and] religious materials.""
The HLP challenged the statute as unconstitutionally vague and as a
violation of their rights of freedom of speech and freedom of association.' 9
The district court agreed with the HLP's vagueness claims but rejected the
freedom of speech and association claims.20 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision.2 1 Congress amended the definition of "material
support or resources" in 2001 to include "expert advice or assistance."2 2
The HLP filed a second action challenging the constitutionality of the stat-
ute as amended.2 3 "In [this] action, the [d]istrict [c]ourt held that the term
'expert advice or assistance' was impermissibly vague" but again rejected
the First Amendment claims.2 4
While the appeal of the second action was pending, Congress again
amended the statute.2 5 In the amendments, Congress clarified the mental
14. PKK did not challenge its designation.
15. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2713.
16. The Plaintiffs will be collectively referred to as the HLP hereafter but actually are the Hu-
manitarian Law Project, Ralph Fertig, Nagalingam Jeyalingam, and five other nonprofit groups.
17. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2714.
18. Id. n.2.
19. Id. at 2714.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1)(2009).
23. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2714-15.
24. Id. at 2715.
25. Id. (amended by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, §6603, 118 Stat. 3762 (2004)).
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state necessary to violate § 2339B, 26 added the term "service" to the defini-
tion of "material support or resources," 27 defined "training," 28 defined "ex-
pert advice or assistance," 29 but most importantly, clarified the scope of
"personnel" by adding:
No person may be prosecuted under [§ 2339B] in connec-
tion with the term 'personnel' unless that person has know-
ingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to
provide a foreign terrorist organization with 1 or more indi-
viduals (who may be or include himself) to work under that
terrorist organization's direction or control or to organize,
manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that
organization. Individuals who act entirely independently of
the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or
objectives shall not be considered to be working under the
foreign terrorist organization's direction and control.30
In light of this new legislation, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the rejection
of the HLP's First Amendment claims, vacated their earlier judgment with
respect to the vagueness of the statute, and remanded to the district
court. 3 1 The district court consolidated both of the HLP's cases and again
decided the case based upon vagueness.3 2 On review of this decision, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the HLP's First Amendment claims, but
held that the statutory terms "training," "expert advice or assistance," and
"service" were unconstitutionally vague.
After twelve years of litigation in the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme
Court granted both the Government and the HLP's petitions for certio-
rari. 34 The Court accepted the HLP's petition challenging the statute's def-
inition of "material support" using terms: "training," "expert advice or
assistance," "service," and "personnel," claiming that each was unconstitu-
tionally vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
and also that each violated the First Amendment freedom of speech and
freedom of association.
The HLP provided support to the PKK and LTTE before the enact-
ment of the statute and claimed that they would like to continue to provide
26. § 2339B was amended to require knowledge of the foreign group's designation as a terrorist
organization or the group's commission of a terrorist act. This amendment will be used by the majority
to support their interpretation of the statute's mental intent requirement. See infra Part III.A.2.
27. § 2339A(b)(1).
28. § 2339A(b)(2) defined "training" as "instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific
skill, as opposed to general knowledge."
29. § 2339A(b)(3) defined "expert advice or assistance" as "advice or assistance derived from
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge."
30. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2010) (quoting § 2339B(h)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2715-16.
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similar support but could not for fear of criminal prosecution.36 The type
of "support" activities in question are: (1) training the PKK to use interna-
tional law to peacefully resolve disputes; (2) political advocacy on behalf of
the Kurds in Turkey; (3) teaching the PKK how to petition the United Na-
tions and other bodies for relief; (4) providing legal expertise in order to
negotiate peace agreements between the LTTE and Sri Lanka; and (5) ad-
vocating politically on behalf of the Tamils in Sri Lanka."
III. INSTANT CASE
A. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion in Holder decided most of the issues that the
parties' raised. This Part will summarily address many of the issues that the
majority analyzed while providing a more in-depth recitation of the major
constitutional issues. This Part will also explain the majority's decisions on
justiciability and statutory interpretation which had to be determined
before the majority could reach the constitutional issues. After discussing
the preliminary issues that the Court decided, this Part will explain the ma-
jority's holding on the issues of vagueness, freedom of speech, and freedom
of association.
1. Justiciability Under Article III
Chief Justice Roberts began the majority opinion by considering
whether the HLP presented a justiciable case under Article 111.38 In a de-
claratory action where, as here, a party was seeking pre-enforcement re-
view of a criminal statute, the Court decided that an Article III analysis
was warranted to determine if there was a case or controversy.39 After
briefly considering the justiciability issue, the Court concluded that there
was a justiciable case under Article III because the HLP "face[d] a 'credi-
ble threat of prosecution' and 'should not be required to await and undergo
a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.' "40
2. Section 2339B's Mental Intent Requirement
The HLP's first substantive argument was that the Court should affirm
the Ninth Circuit without reaching any issues of constitutional law by inter-
preting the "material-support statute" to require proof that a defendant
had intent to further a foreign terrorist organization's illegal activity.4 1
This would have seemingly ended any litigation because the HLP claimed
36. Id. at 2717.
37. Id. at 2716.
38. Id. at 2717.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Babbit v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).
41. Id.
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that they did not have this intent.4 2 The Court, however, summarily re-
jected this interpretation of the statute because § 2339B has an unambigu-
ous mental state requirement which only requires knowledge of a foreign
terrorist group's designation as such; the statute does not require intent to
further illegal terrorism. 43 Sections 2339A and 2339C, which immediately
surround § 2339B, do explicitly require the HLP's suggested mental state,
and the Court reasoned that this made it clear that Congress did not choose
to use the same mental state requirement for § 2339B.44
The HLP relied heavily on Scales v. United States, 45 in which the Court
held that a defendant could not be convicted under the Smith Act 46 unless
that defendant possessed knowledge of a group's illegal activity and had a
specific intent to further the group's illegal activity.47 The Court, however,
readily distinguished Scales because the statute that Scales was decided
under is different than the "material-support statute" in question here-
the Smith Act in Scales required specific mental intent, while § 2339B does
not.48 The Court also recognized that § 2339B does not criminalize mem-
bership in a designated terrorist organization, but it does criminalize pro-
viding material support to that organization.49
3. Challenge on Due Process Grounds
The Court next considered the HLP's challenge to the statute based
upon vagueness in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.5 0 The traditional vagueness rule is that " '[a] conviction fails to
comport with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to
provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited,
or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discrimina-
tory enforcement.' "i5 The Court began its Due Process analysis by recog-
nizing that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly applied the principles by merging
the vagueness and First Amendment claims and considering the statute
based upon facts not before the court.5 2 The Ninth Circuit incorrectly con-
sidered various hypothetical situations, one being if the HLP wanted to file
an amicus curiae brief on behalf of a foreign terrorist group; this analysis
by the Ninth Circuit contravened the long-standing rule that a party's
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2717-18.
45. 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (discussed more infra Part IV).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2006).
47. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2718. The Smith Act made criminal any individual citizen's knowing
membership or involvement with a group that had plans to overthrow the government. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2385.
48. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2718.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).
52. Id. at 2719.
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vagueness claim must apply to their own conduct and not the hypothetical
conduct of others.53
The Court held that the proper inquiry was not whether the material
support statute grants too much enforcement discretion to the govern-
ment-a claim not alleged by the HLP-but only whether the statute ade-
quately provides notice of the prohibited conduct.54 The Court noted
initially that the material support statute uses different terms than any stat-
ute that the Court has struck down for vagueness in the past, and that Con-
gress has narrowed the definitions in the statute over time to further clarify
the terms used." The Court considered it dispositive of the vagueness is-
sue that although in some hypothetical situation the terms of the statute
might be unclear, as applied to the HLP, the terms were clear because most
of the HLP's proposed conduct fell directly under the statute.
The HLP's only proposed activity which was not hypothetical in na-
ture was advocating politically on the Kurds' behalf in Turkey and for the
Tamils in Sri Lanka." The Court, however, held that this conduct was not
prohibited by the statute as it fell under the "independent advocacy" ex-
ception to § 2339B(h) because the HLP would not be acting "in coordina-
tion with, or at the direction of, a foreign terrorist organization."5 8 The
Court further held that a person of ordinary intelligence could understand
the difference between acting independently of and acting at the direction
of another." The Court chose not to address the HLP's final contention
that the statute's construction makes it difficult to know exactly how much
coordination would be necessary to constitute "acting in direction of" be-
cause the answer would require "sheer speculation" in which the Court was
unwilling to engage.60
4. Challenge on First Amendment Freedom of Speech Grounds
The Court began its analysis of the HLP's Freedom of Speech conten-
tions by noting that Congress has not banned the HLP's pure political
speech, that the HLP are entitled to speak and write freely about the PKK
and LTTE, and that the HLP may advocate independently before the
United Nations because Congress has only prohibited "material-support,"
which usually does not take the form of speech.6 1 The Court also rejected
the Government's argument-that § 2339B prohibits only conduct and not
speech-by noting that speech might easily be considered material support
under § 2339B depending on what the HLP said.6 2 If the HLP's speech
53. Id. (citing Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982)).
54. Id. (citing Williams, 553 U.S. at 304).
55. Id. at 2720.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2721.
58. Id. at 2722.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2723.
62. Id. at 2723-24.
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"imparts a 'specific skill' or [is communication] derived from 'specialized
knowledge,' " then it would violate § 2339B; therefore, the HLP's proposed
conduct-training in international law and providing advice on petitioning
the United Nations-are both barred by the statute. But, the Court
noted, if the HLP's speech pertains only to general or unspecialized knowl-
edge, then it is not barred.64
The Court also decided that the statute barred more than just conduct,
requiring a more stringent constitutional test than intermediate scrutiny en-
tails.6' The Court, having already decided that the HLP's proposed con-
duct would be considered material support, next considered the
Government's interest in combating terrorism by addressing the HLP's
contention that their proposed conduct would advance the legitimate, hu-
manitarian activities of the terrorist groups, but not their terrorism.6 6 In
deciding this issue, the Court relied on Congress's findings supporting
§ 2339B which provide that terrorist groups "are so tainted by their crimi-
nal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that
conduct." 6 7 The Court held that Congress's intent in § 301(a)(7) was clear
because Congress had removed an exception from the statute which previ-
ously allowed "material support in the form of 'humanitarian assistance to
persons not directly involved in' terrorist activity," which demonstrated
that Congress rejected the view that peaceful and humanitarian aid would
not have harmful effects."
The Court elaborated on this point by describing the many known ter-
rorist attacks that the PKK and LTTE were responsible for and by describ-
ing many hypothetical situations in which support given for peaceful and
humanitarian purposes could end up aiding a terrorist group's violent
acts.69 The Court held that terrorist groups do not maintain "financial
firewalls" to separate funding or support received for nonviolent activities
and support received for violent activities, and the Court also held that this
view was supported by both the Executive Branch and Congress. 70 In con-
clusion, the Court held that § 2339B, when applied to the HLP's proposed
conduct, does not violate the HLP members' freedom of speech.
5. Challenge on First Amendment Freedom of Association Grounds
The Court readily affirmed the Ninth Circuit's rejection of the HLP's
claim on freedom of association grounds because, as the Ninth Circuit held,
members of the HLP are free to become members of the PKK or LTTE
and may even vigorously support and promote "the political goals of the
63. Id. at 2724.
64. Id. at 2724.
65. Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting § 301(a)(7)).
68. Id. at 2725 (quoting § 2339A(a) (1994 ed.).
69. Id. at 2725-30.
70. Id. at 2725-26.
71. Id. at 2730.
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group[s,]" as long as no "material-support" is given.7 2 The HLP's secon-
dary argument-that their freedom of association was burdened because
they could not provide material support to foreign terrorist organizations
but could to other groups-was also summarily rejected by the Court be-
cause "Congress is not required to ban material support to every group or
none at all.""
6. Summary of the Majority Opinion
In regards to the types of support that the HLP specified that they
wished to give to the PKK and LTTE, Congress's limitation of their speech
and conduct through the statute was consistent with the First and Fifth
Amendments; the Ninth Circuit's judgment was affirmed in part, reversed
in part, and remanded for further proceedings.7 4 Specifically, the Ninth
Circuit's decision on the First Amendment freedom of speech and associa-
tion issues were affirmed, the Ninth Circuit's decision on vagueness in vio-
lation of due process was reversed, and the case was remanded for further
proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's directives."
B. Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Jus-
tices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, begins by agreeing with the majority as to
the statute's vagueness but disagreeing with the majority's holding "that
the Constitution [would] permit the Government to prosecute the HLP
"for engaging in coordinated teaching and advocacy furthering the desig-
nated organizations' lawful political objectives."7 6 The dissent's position is
that all of the HLP's proposed activities are the type that the First Amend-
ment ordinarily protects.
The dissenters' argument is that all of the HLP's proposed activities
involve the communication and advocacy of political ideas and lawful
means of achieving political ends-the type of speech and association
which the First Amendment offers the strongest protection." "Coordina-
tion" with a foreign terrorist group should not deprive the HLP of First
Amendment protection because "the First Amendment protects advocacy
even of unlawful action so long as the advocacy is not 'directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action . . . likely to incite or produce such
action.' "79
The dissent advanced the view that international terrorism, even
though serious and possibly deadly, should not require automatic forfeiture
of First Amendment rights, and that any statute which abridges First
72. Id. (citing Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000)).
73. Id. at 2731.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 2732.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2733 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
2012] 163
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Amendment rights should be subject to strict scrutiny, not the loose "more
demanding" standard used by the majority.so The dissent argued that the
statute, as the Government interprets it, should not survive any applicable
First Amendment standard of review because the Government's compel-
ling interest-protecting the security of the United States from foreign ter-
rorist organizations-is not furthered by the statute's criminal prohibition
of the HLP's proposed activities.s" The dissent would have rejected the
Government's argument that the HLP's support for the PKK and LTTE is
fungible because there is no obvious way in which political advocacy and
peaceful teaching would further a terrorist group's violent ends.8 2
The dissent also discounted the Government's argument that the
HLP's proposed activities would bolster the terrorist organization's legiti-
macy and impede the Government's effort to weaken foreign terrorist
groups because the Government does not forbid all speech which might
legitimize a terrorist group. Speech, association, and related activities
done on behalf of a terrorist group could have a legitimizing effect even if
not done "in coordination with" a terrorist group." This is inconsistent
with prior case law in as much as the First Amendment has always pro-
tected an American's right to belong to any political party, regardless of
any legitimating effect that their membership might have, as long as the
citizen did not participate in the party's illegal purposes.85 The dissent also
disagreed with the Court that teaching the PKK and LTTE about the inter-
national legal system is too dangerous.86
1. The Majority's Deferral to Congress's Judgment
The dissent did not agree with the Court's deferral to Congress's "in-
formed judgment" regarding the legality of the HLP's proposed actions be-
cause the "judicial function commands analysis of whether the specific
conduct charged falls within the reach of the statute and if so whether the
legislation is consonant with the Constitution."8 7 While the Government
may possess expertise in foreign affairs and foreign relations, it is still the
Court's role to determine whether the Government has criminalized First
Amendment protected activity; in this inquiry neither the Government nor
the Court pointed to any non-speculative facts showing that the HLP's
speech-related activities would advance the PKK's or LTTE's unlawful
interests."8
80. Id. at 2733-34.
81. Id. at 2734.
82. Id. at 2735.
83. Id. at 2736.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2736-37 (citing Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S.
1 (1961)).
86. Id. at 2738.
87. Id. at 2739 (quoting Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 844 (1978)).
88. Id.
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2. Avoiding the Constitutional Issue
The dissent also argued that the statute should be construed to pre-
clude the constitutional issue by inferring into the statute a mental intent
requirement whereby defendants must know or intend for their activity to
assist the terrorist group's unlawful terrorist actions.89 This construction of
the statute would allow criminal punishment only when defendants are
aware of or willfully blind themselves to a significant likelihood that their
conduct will materially support a foreign organization's terrorist conduct. 90
This construction of the statute is consistent with § 2339B(a)(1)'s "know-
ingly provides" text and would allow those engaged in pure speech and
association to be protected by the First Amendment while criminally pun-
ishing those who purposefully aid terrorism.9' The dissent's construction of
the statute would require a defendant to know or intend (1) to provide
support/resources, (2) to possess knowledge that the group is a foreign ter-
rorist organization, (3) to possess knowledge that the support is material,
and (4) to possess knowledge that the support is significantly likely to fur-
ther terrorism.92 However, the more stringent mental intent would not be
required when "material support" took the form of "currency," "financial
services," or any of the other specifically prohibited items listed in
§ 2339A(b)(1) because these types of aid are "fungible" and thus more
likely to actually support violence.93 The dissent argued that the statute's
history supported this interpretation9 4 and is demanded by the principle of
constitutional avoidance, which requires the Court to "'read the statute to
eliminate' [the] constitutional 'doub[t] so long as such a reading is not
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.'" 95
3. The Dissent's Conclusion
Having construed the statute to require a more stringent mental in-
tent, thereby avoiding the constitutional issue, the dissent would have re-
manded the case for the lower court to further consider the HLP's
proposed activities and to determine if the HLP was entitled to injunctive
relief.96 The dissent argued that the majority failed to examine the Gov-
ernment's justifications for the statute with enough care, failed to ask for
specific evidence, and failed to require tailoring of the statute to fit only
specific ends.97
89. Id. at 2740.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2740-41.
93. Id. at 2741.
94. See H.R. REP. No. 104-383 (1995); 142 CONG. REC. S3354 (1996).
95. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2742 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2743.
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IV. HISTORY OF THE LAW
Historically, the First Amendment has provided very broad protection
of speech. Specifically, it has long been the view of the Supreme Court that
the First Amendment's protections were "fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people."9 8 Moreover, there is long-standing case law that
the First Amendment protects any group's right to openly disagree and
protest conditions of government or government policy and that any gov-
ernment attempt to punish or limit citizens' rights to protest or advocate
for changes cannot comport with the First Amendment.9 9 Indeed, "[t]he
maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion . . . is a funda-
mental principle of our constitutional system." 00
As early as 1938, the Court struck down-on First Amendment
grounds-a city ordinance which required persons to get a license to dis-
tribute leaflets or pamphlets, holding that the free expression of ideas was
an "essential liberty.""o' This essential liberty even went as far as protect-
ing "vigorous advocacy" of unpopular causes from government
intrusion.102
General categories of judicial review have since developed that courts
use whenever enacted laws or policies implicate First Amendment issues.
These judicially created levels of scrutiny are especially important to ana-
lyze the Holder majority's chosen level of scrutiny because, as Part V will
argue, there is a serious issue concerning the majority's chosen level of re-
view. This Part will set out the historical levels of scrutiny used by the
Supreme Court to review statutes restricting the freedom of speech, and
Part V will argue that the majority should have applied strict scrutiny to
§ 2339B in Holder. This Part will also argue that, notwithstanding the ma-
jority's decision not to apply strict scrutiny, the majority incorrectly applied
the more rigorous scrutiny standard.
A. Intermediate Scrutiny
United States v. O'Brien concerned a First Amendment challenge to
O'Brien's criminal conviction for publicly burning his military draft card at
a protest. 103 In O'Brien, the Court coined what has since been called the
"intermediate scrutiny" test under the First Amendment, which is appro-
priate when a statute criminalizes speech-related conduct as opposed to the
actual speech.104 Under intermediate scrutiny, the First Amendment is not
violated when there is a substantial government interest, the government
98. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
99. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
100. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
101. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
102. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537
(1945); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259-64 (1937)).
103. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
104. Id. at 377.
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used a narrow means to protect that interest, and only non-communicative
conduct is prohibited.1 15 The Court later succinctly defined the intermedi-
ate scrutiny analysis as a "regulation [that] will be sustained under the First
Amendment if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to
the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more
speech than necessary to further those interests."10 6 When conduct (in-
stead of pure speech) is involved, it must first be determined whether the
conduct was expressive or communicative; then it must be determined
whether the regulation/law in question is related to the suppression of that
expression.' 0 7 If the regulation/law is not related to expression, then the
intermediate scrutiny analysis from O'Brien for the regulation of non-com-
municative conduct will control. But if the regulation/law is related to ex-
pression, then a heightened standard applies.108
B. More Rigorous Scrutiny
After O'Brien, Cohen v. California marked the emergence of a more
rigorous scrutiny, as Cohen involved a state punishing the more communi-
cative aspects of conduct, namely, the defendant Cohen being convicted of
disturbing the peace when he wore a jacket with some obscene language
written on it that described Cohen's personal disapproval of the military
draft.1 09 However, as the Court noted, the words on Cohen's jacket were
not directed to insult any individuals, nor were they intended to arouse any
violence; so the greatest interest that the state had in prohibiting Cohen's
conduct was the protecting of unwilling viewers from Cohen's choice lan-
guage."o As this state interest did not fall within the traditional categories
of exceptions to First Amendment protection, the Court held that it was
insufficient and thus not able to survive the heightened scrutiny, which re-
sulted in Cohen's conviction being reversed."1' More rigorous scrutiny,
falling between intermediate and strict scrutiny, requires a more compel-
ling, more defined government interest than intermediate scrutiny, while
also requiring that the law serving that interest be narrowly tailored to
achieve only that interest.' 12
C. Strict Scrutiny
In Texas v. Johnson, the Court had to decide whether to apply
O'Brien's intermediate scrutiny test or a stricter scrutiny test to a Texas
statute which criminalized desecrating a flag. '3 After considering the de-
fendant Johnson's action of burning a flag, the Court decided that a person
105. Id. at 381-82.
106. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
107. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989).
108. Id.
109. 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
110. Id. at 20-21.
111. Id. at 26.
112. See id. at 17-19.
113. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399.
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only burns a flag as a means of communication, thus O'Brien would not
apply.1 14 Moreover, the Court held that because Johnson's act of burning a
flag was a means of political expression and was prohibited based upon the
content of the communication, the statute prohibiting it had to be subjected
to the "most exacting scrutiny."11 5 Content-based prohibitions occur when
communication is prohibited depending solely on the substance of the com-
munication, and because this category of regulation draws closely to the
government telling citizens what they can and cannot do or say, these regu-
lations must pass the highest level of scrutiny." 6 So, applying strict scru-
tiny, the communicative conduct of burning a flag was held to be protected
by the First Amendment freedom of speech because the state had no inter-
est sufficient to support Johnson's conviction and deprive Johnson of his
freedom of speech." 7
In a recent case, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the
Court decided that a federal law which prohibited corporations and unions
from using their general treasury funds to make contributions for candi-
dates' political speeches did not pass the strict scrutiny analysis that is used
whenever a statute encumbers political speech."' The Court concluded
that "[t]he First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain
subjects or viewpoints."" 9 The Court did note that exceptions to the First
Amendment's general protection of political speech have been made when
the speech in question was held to interfere with government functions,
stating that "these precedents stand only for the proposition that there are
certain governmental functions that cannot operate without some restric-
tions on particular kinds of speech."120 But the Court went on to conclude
that "[i]f the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from
fining or jailing citizens . . . for simply engaging in political speech." 2 '
In Citizens United, the Court held that strict scrutiny analysis "re-
quire[d] the Government to prove that the restriction 'furthers a compel-
ling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.' "122 The
Court has also stated that strict scrutiny requires "a narrowly tailored
means of serving a compelling [governmental] interest. "123
114. Id. at 410 (noting that O'Brien's test concerned non-communicative conduct, thus Johnson's
conduct was outside the scope of O'Brien's test).
115. Id. at 412 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
116. Id. (citing Boos, 485 U.S. at 321).
117. Id. at 420.
118. 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 899.
121. Id. at 904.
122. Id. at 898 (quoting Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 464).
123. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 535-44 (1980) (hold-
ing a statute which prohibited an electric company from including political leaflet material along with
their customers' bills unconstitutional under strict scrutiny review because it was a State suppression of
political communication).
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D. Summary of the Scrutiny Tests
When a statute contains language that may impinge upon First
Amendment freedom of speech protections, one of the scrutiny tests will
apply when courts review it for constitutional purposes.124 The higher the
level of scrutiny, the more justification must be provided by the govern-
ment to support the statute.125 The level of scrutiny the court will use when
reviewing the statute, for First Amendment purposes, depends upon what
type of communication is being burdened or regulated by the statute.126
The easiest form of scrutiny for a statute to pass is intermediate scrutiny,
followed by more rigorous scrutiny, and ending with strict scrutiny being
the most difficult type of review for a statute to withstand.127 Intermediate
scrutiny applies to statutes that regulate conduct-but only when that con-
duct is not being used as a form of communication.' 28 The Court has ap-
plied more rigorous scrutiny in the past when communicative conduct was
being restricted.129 The freedom of speech, being an essential liberty, stat-
utes restricting most other forms of communication, especially political ex-
pression and political speech, have traditionally been subject to strict
scrutiny.130 These important historical distinctions in the scrutiny tests pro-
vide the basis for Part V of this Note which will argue that the Court's
chosen more rigorous level of scrutiny, and its application, do not fall
within the established boundaries of the scrutiny tests.
E. Breadth of the First Amendment's Protections
The First Amendment's normal broad protections require that "when
legitimate legislative concerns are expressed in a statute which imposes a
substantial burden on protected First Amendment activities, Congress must
achieve its goal by means which have a 'less drastic' impact on the contin-
ued vitality of First Amendment freedoms."' 3 ' A narrow means of advanc-
ing a governmental interest is always required as the First Amendment
does not allow broad, sweeping infringements on enumerated individual
rights, no matter how strong the government's interest is.132
For example, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, Ohio had a state law which
criminally punished any person who advocated for using crime, violence, or
sabotage as a means of instituting industrial or political reform.133 Ohio's
law was one that most would consider as addressing a valid issue and legis-
lative concern but, nonetheless, when the leader of the Ku Klux Klan was
124. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375-77 (1968); see also Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 16 (1971); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980).
125. See Consol. Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 530-35.
126. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 15-17 (1971).
127. See supra Part IV.A.-C.
128. See supra Part IV.A.
129. See supra Part IV.B.
130. See supra Part IV.C.
131. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967) (emphasis in original).
132. See id.
133. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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convicted under this law, the Supreme Court reversed his conviction hold-
ing the state law unconstitutional under the First Amendment, reasoning
that "we are here confronted with a statute which, by its own words and as
applied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of crimi-
nal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the described
type of action." 1 34 Brandenburg is one in a line of cases where the Court
developed the rule that advocacy-even advocacy or encouragement to en-
gage in unlawful action-cannot be made illegal, consistent with the First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech, unless the advocacy is (1) directed
to incite lawless actions, (2) the advocacy makes the unlawful action immi-
nent, and (3) the advocacy is likely to produce or incite unlawful action.
In other words, the line of cases dealing with advocacy has an intent or
purposeful direction requirement, meaning that as long as a person does
not direct her advocacy for the purpose of producing imminent unlawful
action, her advocacy would be protected under the First Amendment. 3 6
But the First Amendment's protections do not stop there. In De Jonge
v. Oregon, the defendant, a member of the Communist Party, materially
helped the Party to organize and conduct a meeting, the purpose of the
meeting being to recruit new members, encourage people to defy the au-
thority of the local police, protest local jail conditions, and to participate in
certain, other revolutionary tactics. 137 After being criminally convicted
under a California law, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant's con-
viction holding that the defendant had the right, pursuant to the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, to peacefully speak and advocate even if the
objectives of that speech were in furtherance of the Communist Party.13 8
In Scales v. United States, the Court considered First Amendment im-
plications when reviewing the defendant's conviction under the Smith Act,
which made it a crime to knowingly be a member of any group or organiza-
tion which intends to overthrow the government. 1 3 9 In Scales, the Court
upheld the defendant's conviction for membership in the Communist Party
because the defendant was knowingly a member of a party whose intent
was to overthrow the government; however, the Court noted that a blanket
prohibition covering speech or association with any group that has both
legal and illegal aims would be questioned under the First Amendment be-
cause legitimate political expression might be impaired.140
The Court in Scales based its decision on the Act's language which
only criminally proscribed "active membership" in the Communist Party,
134. Id. at 449.
135. Id. at 447. See also Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
136. See id.
137. 299 U.S. 353, 359 (1937).
138. Id. at 365-66.
139. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
140. Id. at 229.
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or membership with the specific intent to carry out the organization's un-
lawful purposes. 141 The only reason the Smith Act passed constitutional
muster was because of its intent requirement. 142 The Court has reaffirmed
the rule that there must be "specific intent" purposed to bring about illegal
action in order for mere membership in an organization to be criminalized
consistent with the First Amendment.143
F. Exceptions to the First Amendment's Protections
The Supreme Court has consistently held that although the First
Amendment generally prevents the government from proscribing speech
or expressive conduct, there are certain recognized, limited areas to which
the First Amendment protection does not extend.144 These areas are con-
sidered to be small in social value, of little benefit to society, and out-
weighed by concerns for societal order. 145 They consist of speech such as
obscenities and defamation.146
Roth v. United States was the first case in which the Court squarely
faced the issue of obscenity and the degree of protection obscenity receives
under the First Amendment. 147 Holding that obscenities were not pro-
tected under the First Amendment, the Court seemed to determine what
would be protected by asking whether the expression had "the slightest
redeeming social importance"; but the Court also noted that "unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of
opinion-have the full protection." 148
Similarly, there is a long-standing rule that libelous speech is never
protected by the First Amendment. 149 Because libel was a crime through-
out the common law, the Court has had little problem reaffirming the no-
tion that the First Amendment is not a free pass to libel and defame
individuals whenever a person so chooses.1 50
G. The Connection Between the First Amendment
and National Security
The Court in United States v. Robel considered the interplay between
the First Amendment's protection of individual liberties and Congress's in-
terest in maintaining national security, but the Court did not find a national
141. Id. at 229-230.
142. See id. See also Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (decided on the same day).
143. E.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
144. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Beauhar-
nais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
145. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 382-83.
146. Id. (citing Roth, 354 U.S. at 476-84; Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 255-57).
147. 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
148. Id. at 484.
149. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 255-57.
150. See id. at 254-60.
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security exception to the First Amendment and thus required that any leg-
islation affecting a First Amendment right-even adverse to national secur-
ity-must be "narrowly drawn legislation."1 5 ' Even when interests of
national security are at stake, the Court has held that legislation does not
comport with First Amendment requirements when other means of achiev-
ing the same goal are available which are less restrictive on individual
rights.152 Moreover, no governmental interest-even national security-
can ever allow an overbroad or sweeping statute to comport with the First
Amendment's protections on individual rights.'
Robel concerned the prosecution of the defendant under the Subver-
sive Activities Control Act of 1950 which in part required any member of a
Communist Organization to register as such, and the Act also made it a
crime for any member of a Communist Organization to work at a defense
facility.154 The defendant, being employed as a machinist at a shipyard in
Seattle, Washington, was a registered member of a Communist Organiza-
tion and when the Secretary of Defense designated that shipyard as a "de-
fense facility," the defendant was prosecuted under the Subversive
Activities Control Act.
Initially, the district court avoided declaring the Act unconstitutional
by reading into the Act an unwritten requirement of active membership in
the Communist group and specific intent to violate the Act.156 The govern-
ment, however, was unwilling to accept this reading of the statute and ap-
pealed the district court's interpretation and dismissal, which was certified
on direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court chose not to read additional words into the statute
to try to save it as the district court did but instead struck it down as being
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.'5 8 While the district court
relied on Scales to imply into the statute a requirement of specific intent to
further the unlawful goals of the Communist Organization in order for a
defendant to violate the statute, the Supreme Court held that requiring
such an intent would amount to a practical rewriting of the statute.159 The
Supreme Court continued its analysis by noting that even Congress's War
Power could not remove constitutional safeguards which serve to protect
essential individual liberties, nor could the concept of national defense jus-
tify abridging fundamental liberties.'60 While recognizing that the legisla-
ture's stated purpose of protecting against sabotage and espionage in the
Nation's defense plants was substantial, the Court concluded that the
151. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1967). But cf Deborah Hellman, Money
Talks but It Isn't Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953 (2011).
152. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
153. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967).
154. Robel, 389 U.S. at 259-60.
155. Id. at 260.
156. Id. at 261.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 262.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 264.
[VOL. 31:155172
THINK BEFORE YOU SPEAK
method chosen by Congress invaded the First Amendment's protections.16 1
The Court also recognized that the statute was invalid because it did not
consider that a person might be a member of a group without being aware
of or sharing in the group's unlawful aims.162
Overall, the legislature has the task of enacting legislation that is not
overbroad and that is narrowly-tailored to achieve its purpose; when the
content of legislation impacts areas which the First Amendment has tradi-
tionally protected, Congress must choose the means of regulation which
have a "less drastic" effect on First Amendment freedoms."'3 When Con-
gress fails in this regard, it is the responsibility of the Court to strike down




It would be a difficult task to read the Court's decision in Holder and
reconcile it with the Court's previous freedom of speech decisions. When
considering the Court's previous First Amendment cases discussed in Part
IV, Holder represents a sizeable restraint on individual rights which have
long been thought of as protected by the First Amendment. The focus of
this analysis is the inability to fit the Court's decision into previous areas of
First Amendment case law, the vast inconsistency of Holder when com-
pared to previous freedom of speech law, and the unavoidable outcome of
punishing innocent Americans along with the terrorists.
B. Finding the Correct Level of Scrutiny
The greatest point of contention between the parties when the Court
was deciding the freedom of speech aspects in Holder was the level of scru-
tiny that the Court should use to review the statute."6 s Both the HLP and
the government took somewhat extreme positions: the government's posi-
tion being that only conduct was at issue, while the HLP argued that pure
political speech was being prohibited.166 If the Court had sided with the
government on this issue, then the intermediate scrutiny test from United
States v. O'Brien would have applied.16 7 The intermediate scrutiny test
would have required only a substantial governmental interest, and a nar-
row means used to protect that interest in order to pass constitutional mus-
ter under the First Amendment. 68
161. Id. at 264-65.
162. Id. at 266.
163. Id. at 268.
164. See id.
165. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2722-25 (2010).
166. Id.
167. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
168. Id. at 381-82.
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On the other hand, statutes affecting pure political speech require
evaluation under the highest level of scrutiny: strict scrutiny.169 Strict scru-
tiny has been defined by the Court as "a narrowly tailored means of serving
a compelling [governmental] interest"; satisfying both the narrow tailoring
and compelling interest elements are required for a statute to be consistent
with what the First Amendment requires under strict scrutiny.170
The Supreme Court declined to side with either the government or the
HLP, but instead decided that a "more rigorous scrutiny" than intermedi-
ate needed to be applied to the statute but still less than strict scrutiny. 171
The most glaring problem with the Court's chosen level of scrutiny was not
in the decision to use a heightened scrutiny but was in its application of
that more rigorous scrutiny; or stated differently, the Court used the cor-
rect scrutiny test but incorrectly applied it.
Cohen v. California illustrates an instance in which the Court has pre-
viously chosen to use this "more rigorous scrutiny." 172 A casual reading of
Cohen does seem to support the Court's decision to use this more rigorous
scrutiny since Cohen concerned a situation where an individual acted, not
with intent to do harm, but where Cohen's actions arguably violated a stat-
ute.173 Cohen was prosecuted because he wore a jacket with strong lan-
guage which communicated his disapproval of the military draft instituted
by the legislature.174 A detailed reading of Cohen reveals that this more
rigorous scrutiny standard required a state interest-not quite compel-
ling-but which is sufficient, communicated and narrowly tailored in its
execution.s1 7  Cohen even went so far as to require that the state interest
fall within one of the traditional categories of exceptions to the First
Amendment freedom of speech in order to survive the heightened
scrutiny. 176
When applying this standard to § 2339B in Holder, the government
produced little evidence which demonstrated how § 2339B was narrowly
tailored. No court or legal analyst would likely argue that preventing ter-
rorism is not an important and even compelling governmental interest, but
compelling governmental interests do not give Congress free reign to over-
look the First Amendment.' Statutes infringing on the freedom of
speech, and triggering heightened scrutiny require narrow tailoring."17
Narrow tailoring, by the Court's definition, means that broad sweeping in-
fringements on enumerated rights-like the freedom of speech-are not
allowed and that less drastic means must be used if at all possible.17 9 There
169. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007).
170. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980).
171. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2724.
172. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
173. Id. at 20-21 (Cohen was prosecuted for violating a breach of the peace statute).
174. Id. at 16.
175. See id. at 16-26.
176. Id. at 26.
177. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 266-68 (1967).
178. Id.
179. See id. at 266-69.
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is no substitute for the narrow tailoring requirement in this level of scru-
tiny, regardless of how compelling the governmental interest may be.180
Justice Breyer captures the beginning of this problem in his dissent as
he recognized that this standard of scrutiny and the narrow tailoring should
have required the government to demonstrate exactly how the HLP's
teaching and advocacy was linked to the terrorist's illegal objectives.18' Ex-
panding upon Justice Breyer's contentions, if the government was unable
to explain how prohibiting the type of advocacy proposed by the HLP ad-
vanced the objective of eliminating violence by terrorists, then prohibiting
that advocacy could not have been a narrowly tailored means of dealing
with the problem of terrorist violence. When the created solution infringes
upon protected, fundamental rights, then the solution does not fit the defi-
nition of narrow tailoring. 18 2
Secondly, as recognized by the dissent, the government's affidavits and
findings were too generic to satisfy narrow tailoring because they failed to
amply show that other less drastic means were unavailable to combat ter-
rorism without abridging citizen's freedom of speech.183 Unspecified, ge-
neric findings have never been enough to satisfy a level of review requiring
narrow tailoring. 184 Narrow tailoring requires some factual showing which
supports the proposed measure as an appropriate solution to a problem.1 8 1
Further, narrow tailoring requires the exhaustion of less drastic alterna-
tives.186 Findings of the type provided in Holder satisfy none of the require-
ments or purposes of narrow tailoring.
C. Political Speech
1. Section 2339B's Lack of a Specific Intent Requirement
Overall, Holder held that the HLP's projected advocacy and speech
was not protected political speech, a decision which is difficult to reconcile
with the Court's previous decisions but nevertheless understandable con-
sidering § 2339B's likely inability to survive a strict scrutiny review. Politi-
cal speech has traditionally been given the highest level of protection under
the First Amendment.1 8 7 Therefore, an interesting byproduct of Holder
along with § 2339B is an erosion of what once was considered protected
speech. Indeed, Holder seems to have shifted the Court's focus when deal-
ing with political speech from a focus on the intent behind the speech-a
180. See id.
181. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2731-38 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182. See generally United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265-69 (1967).
183. See Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2732-34.
184. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1968). See also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
185. See e.g. Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Dallas, 885 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (hold-
ing that narrow tailoring means a statute remedying the problem it sought to address).
186. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (holding that narrow tailoring means not burdening more speech
than necessary to protect government interest). See also Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Mineta, 532 U.S. 967
(2001) (holding that narrow tailoring is not satisfied if other more neutral solutions are possible).
187. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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Brandenburg or De Jonge v. Oregon type analysis' 88-to a focus on the
actual words utilized by the speaker's approach. 189
For instance, the majority gives the example that if a member of the
HLP's speech was common or general, then it would be protected. But if
the speech provided a specific skill or gave advice derived from specific
knowledge, then it would violate the statute and could result in criminal
punishment, notwithstanding the First Amendment. 190 Disregarding the
inherent difficulty in determining what might be considered a specific skill
or specialized knowledge,1 9 1 this approach in determining the breadth of
the freedom of speech is a distinct migration from the often used intent-
based approach in Brandenburg.'9 2 Moreover, the Court left no doubt that
this is the standard as the Court explicitly declined to extend the Branden-
burg intent-based inquiry to cases being prosecuted under § 2339B.193
Now an American's freedom of speech depends only upon what he or she
says and to whom he or she says it. The intent behind why the person said
what he or she said is now irrelevant. 194
This decision could be classified as an example of the Court manipulat-
ing existing case law in order to get a different, more preferred result. Con-
sider what result would have likely occurred had the Court applied
Brandenburg to the statute in question and the facts in Holder. Branden-
burg required three things for speech to be unprotected by the First
Amendment: (1) the intent and purpose to use speech to incite unlawful
action; (2) speech which makes unlawful action imminent; and (3) speech
which is likely to produce or incite unlawful action.' 95 In short, Branden-
burg requires a person or group to have the intent or purpose to use their
speech to incite or promote imminent unlawful action.196 The government
conceded that the HLP only wished to train members of the PKK on how
to use international law to peacefully resolve disputes, engage in political
188. See id. at 447; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365-66 (1937).
189. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723-24 ("Plaintiffs want to speak to
the PKK and LTTE, and whether they may do so under § 2339B depends on what they say.").
190. Id. at 2724.
191. Outside the scope of this note, there is a legitimate concern that Holder provides very little
guidance as to what speech or conduct may actually be criminally punishable. Thus, the Court's sum-
mary dismissal of vagueness challenges to the statutes in Holder may cause concern for some trying to
apply the Court's decision and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
192. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
193. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2717.
194. The Court interpreted § 2339B(a)(1) not to have an intent to further the illegal aspects of
terrorism requirement, in light of surrounding §§ 2339A(a) and 2339C(a)(1) which do contain a specific
intent provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (one who "provides material support ... knowing or in-
tending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of. . ."). See also 18
U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1) ("[one who] unlawfully and willfully provides or collects funds with the intention
that such funds be used, or with knowledge that such funds are to be used, in full or in part, in order to
carry out [other unlawful acts]").
195. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
196. See id.
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advocacy on behalf of the Kurds, teach members of the PKK how to peti-
tion various bodies such as the United Nations for relief, offer legal exper-
tise in negotiating peace agreements between the LTTE and Sri Lanka, and
engage in political advocacy on behalf of Tamils in Sri Lanka. 19 7
In considering the HLP's proposed speech, the majority acknowledged
that the HLP only possessed the intent to facilitate the lawful, nonviolent
purposes of both the PKK and LTTE and that any speech or advocacy
made by the HLP to the PKK or LTTE would be in furtherance of only this
purpose. 1 9 8 So, had the Court applied Brandenburg, the government
would not have been able to demonstrate that the HLP's speech violated
even the first prong, and therefore their speech would have been protected.
Brandenburg was decided in 1969. With September 11, 2001 still in recent
memory, perhaps the Court is setting precedent that statutes involving for-
eign policy will be analyzed differently under the First Amendment. This
conclusion is warranted since applying Brandenburg seemingly would have
produced an unfavorable result; and the Court showed obvious overall con-
cerns about the possibly tragic and devastating effects that the HLP's
speech might end up having despite what the HLP's intent was behind their
speech directed at either the PKK or LTTE.19 9 Holder could possibly re-
present the first in a line of cases to come where the First Amendment
freedom of speech is further restricted by statutes with the purpose of pros-
ecuting those suspected of supporting terrorism.
2. The Problems with Content-based Restrictions on Speech
Even with legitimate concerns about terrorism, Holder prohibits
speech-dependent upon what is said and to whom it is said-and this ap-
proach is bending, if not breaking the Court's prior decisions which do not
allow content-based restrictions on political speech.2 0 0 What Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission seemed to circle back around to is
the principal that broad-sweeping restrictions on enumerated rights, or cat-
egorical prohibitions on enumerated rights, cannot be upheld. 201 This
again suggests that a statute, like § 2339B, should be required-under nar-
row tailoring and political speech requirements-to use a more in-depth
inquiry before criminally prosecuting someone for their speech. (Perhaps
even an intent-based approach).20 2 In addition to the inconsistent approach
taken by the Court here, there is the concerning problem of increasing gov-
ernment control over an area which was traditionally a broad individual
right. Shrinking the freedom of speech in this manner is not only a restric-
tion on what could easily be considered political speech but is treading
197. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2716.
198. Id. at 2712.
199. Id. at 2724.
200. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) ("political speech
simply cannot be banned or restricted as a categorical matter").
201. See id.
202. But recall from Part III supra that the Court refused to employ an intent based approach.
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closely to government control over speech concerning unpopular or unfa-
vorable topics. Consistent with our system of government, Congress does
not have the power to control what people speak about as the freedom of
speech is an enumerated right and a fundamental principle upon which our
country was founded.2 03
D. The Supreme Court's Endorsement
of Congressional Findings
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project also seems to create an uncom-
fortable procedural precedent concerning the amount of deference that
was given by the Court to Congressional and Executive findings. Consider
the Court's endorsement of Congressional findings which read, " 'Foreign
organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their crimi-
nal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that
conduct.' "204
Judicial deference to the findings of the other branches of government
has long been a topic of much discussion in the legal community, but truly
there has not developed any general rules by which courts abide.2 05
Through the uncertainty, the Supreme Court has produced a few holdings
which provide guidance in these situations. First, courts are not supposed
to blindly accept legislative findings concerning constitutional issues.206
Secondly, the Supreme Court has held that in the absence of specific coun-
tervailing considerations, like the potential violation of a constitutional right,
the Court recognizes the heavy presumption "to which 'a carefully consid-
ered decision of a coequal and representative branch of our Government'
is entitled." 207
What these holdings from the Supreme Court demonstrate is the gen-
eral allowance of deference to Congressional findings, except when there is
a potential violation of a constitutional right.208 Where an enumerated
constitutional right is concerned, this deference to Congressional findings is
improper.2 09 In Holder, because there was an express, fundamental right at
issue-the freedom of speech-the amount of deference given to Congres-
sional findings causes concern. Even cases which were not dealing with
203. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); see also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229, 237 (1963) ("[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.
It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest . . .").
204. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 301(a)(7)).
205. E.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 IND.
L.J. 1 (2008); Angela J. Paolini, Note, Administrative Law-Supreme COURT DEFERS TO CONGRES-
SIONAL Intent in Social Security Disability Benefit Delays, 60 TUL. L. REV. 205 (1985); Saul M. Pilchen,
Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme COURT SHOULD DEFER TO CONGRESSIONAL
Factfinding Under the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 337 (1984).
206. See e.g. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) ("the existence of congressional
findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation").
207. U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721 (1990) (quoting Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319 (1985).
208. See id.; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-16.
209. See id.
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express, fundamental rights do not require blind adherence to Congres-
sional findings by the Court.2 10 Because the First Amendment right at is-
sue in Holder is such an important, fundamental right, the Court should
have engaged in a detailed examination of Congress's stated position to
make sure that Congress's findings established the logical link required
before the Court endorsed the findings. 11
The Court's endorsement of the Congressional findings means that
even if foreign terrorist groups could be shown legal, non-violent means to
accomplish their religious, political or other goals, they would still commit
acts of violence. It is an interesting position taken by Congress and the
Court when considering that if an American citizen truly believed he could
change the methodology used by these foreign terrorist groups and went
about teaching the terrorist groups legal methods to achieve political or
other goals, then that American could not rely on his freedom of speech in
doing so.
It is also inconsistent with the deference given to the Congressional
findings by the Court and with the level of importance of the statute al-
luded to by the Court, that there be an exemption for medicine and relig-
ious materials.212 Foreign terrorist organizations are so devoted and
predisposed to committing acts of violence (according to the Congressional
finding) that American citizens do not have their freedom of speech when
conversing with such a group, but providing medical supplies does not sup-
port the terrorist group? If terrorist groups engage in armed hostile con-
flicts with others, or even simply throughout the course of conducting
routine business, medical supplies will be needed and if they were not
donated would have to be purchased. Therefore, allowing Americans to
give medical supplies to terrorist groups frees up the terrorist group's
money that it would otherwise have spent on medical supplies. Donating
medical supplies has never been held to be a fundamental right, and it
seems to be out of place that this remains a legal contribution under the
statute. If the Congressional findings are accurate, and any aid to a terror-
ist group only furthers violence, then the statute seems to be under-
inclusive.213
The overall problem with the type of policy announced by the Con-
gressional findings, whether inherently correct or not, is that innocent
American citizens' fundamental rights are greatly reduced. The freedom of
expression of ideas is an "essential liberty" and should not be undermined
by requiring a person to consider how their words might be interpreted,
even when their intent is pure.2 1 Constricting an express, essential liberty
210. See e.g. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997).
211. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-16.
212. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b).
213. It is not this author's position that this statute should be so barbaric as to ban the giving of
medical supplies or religious materials. However, the realty remains that donating medical supplies
frees up terrorist groups' funds to be spent on other things, and building churches provides terrorist
groups with a place to meet and assemble.
214. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
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of American citizens in the hope that doing so will inhibit a terrorist
group's ability to function is offensive to the Constitution.215 American
citizens having the freedom to exchange ideas without any encumbrances is
a principle that America was founded upon, was a major reason for
America's growth to its current position in the world, and has always been
an important method for bringing about changes desired by the citizens.216
Even if one accepted the Congressional findings as sound reasoning, a
problem still remains with the portion of § 2339B which allows members of
the HLP or any American citizen to lawfully become members of the PKK,
LTTE, or similarly known terrorist organizations.217 In light of the Con-
gressional finding in § 301(a)(7), this provision seems to be against all logic.
If foreign terrorist organizations are so tainted by their criminal conduct
that any contribution to the group facilitates that conduct, then how is an
American citizen becoming a member of the group, enlarging the size of
the group, and thereby enhancing the prestige and legitimacy of the group
tolerable? Secondly, how is an American citizen to be a member-and
presumably an active member-but yet not provide any material support
to the group? Many American citizens will possess at least some "special-
ized skill" which is what makes them marketable for employment purposes.
Under § 2339B, any such person would not be allowed to be a contributing
or active member of a foreign terrorist organization for fear that their
speech would be criminal. Hypothetically, a lawyer group member could
provide no legal advice to other group members, and a doctor could pro-
vide no medical services to other group members as this would constitute a
"specialized skill" and could be criminal under § 2339B.21 8 This begs the
question of why the Court would explicitly recognize an American citizen's
right to become a member of a foreign terrorist group but then not men-
tion that much of an American's contributions to such a group could be
criminal under § 2339B.
One explanation for having a seemingly thin exemption recognized
would be to avoid any problem such as the one in Scales v. United States.219
In Scales, because the Smith Act criminalized mere membership in prohib-
ited groups, like the Communist Party, the Court held that to comport with
Constitutional standards a specific intent requirement-much like the one
215. See generally Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); see also Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 488 (noting that "ceaseless vigilance" will be required to prevent Congress and the States
from eroding First Amendment protections).
216. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 488 ("The fundamental freedom[s] of speech and press have contrib-
uted greatly to the development and well being of our free society and are indispensable to its contin-
ued growth.").
217. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010) ("[statute] does not pre-
vent [plaintiffs] from becoming members of the PKK and LTTE or impose any sanction on them for
doing so").
218. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2) ("instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as
opposed to general knowledge") (emphasis added).
219. 367 U.S. 203, 205 (1961).
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rejected in Holder-had to be used.2 20 Therefore, by providing an exemp-
tion which allows citizens to be members in a foreign terrorist organization,
a Scales-type problem is avoided and the Court was able to uphold § 2339B
despite the statute having no specific intent requirement.
E. The Supreme Court's Treatment of the
Independent Advocacy Exemption
In the Court's analysis, it also endorsed the statute's independent ad-
vocacy exemption as another reason why the HLP's or other citizen's free-
dom of speech was not burdened. 2 2 ' This provision in the statute, in
essence, means that a person may campaign or advocate for a cause that
might happen to be in line with the goals of a foreign terrorist group such
as the PKK or LTTE, and may do so without criminal prosecution so long
as they are not acting at the direction of the foreign terrorist group. 222 The
Court also summarily rejected the HLP's requests to have the Court define
more specifically where the line would be drawn when considering what is
independent advocacy. 223 Although the Court justified its refusal to fur-
ther interpret this portion of the statute by stating that it would not engage
in sheer speculation,224 the Court's refusal to address the issue creates a
facial conflict with the portion of the statute that allows American citizens
to become members of foreign terrorist organizations.225
The problem created with these two provisions is that, from the
Court's opinion, the appearance is created that a citizen does not have his
or her freedom of speech impinged upon because he or she is able to be-
come a member of a foreign terrorist organization and advocate indepen-
dently for any causes for which he or she wishes to advocate. 226 This is the
appearance given by the Court and is also used as a major justification by
the Court to support the Court's holding that the statute did not violate
citizen's freedom of speech; this is how the Court seems to get around pun-
ishing pure political speech or advocacy by providing these exemptions,
which seemingly could be used together.227 But these exemptions run afoul
of common sense and other provisions of § 2339B which prevent citizens
from acting or working under the direction or control of a foreign terrorist
220. Id. at 220-22.
221. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2723.
222. See § 2339B(h). For problems with this approach, see Wadie E. Said, The Terrorist Inform-
ant, a5 WASH. L. REv. 687 (2010).
223. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2722.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 2723 ("Section 2339B also 'does not prevent [plaintiffs] from becoming members of the
PKK and LTTE or impose any sanction on them for doing so.' "). See also Justin A. Fraterman,
Criminalizing Humanitarian Relief Are US Material Support for Terrorism Laws Compatible with Inter-
national Humanitarian Law? (January 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1750963.
226. See id. at 2723.
227. See id.
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organization. 228 From a common sense standpoint, it would be a practical
impossibility for someone to be a member of a group or organization, and
to be advocating for the same causes and goals of the group, but then to
still consider himself to be acting "entirely independently" from the
group's direction.229
What this dichotomy becomes is a ban on a citizen's freedom of speech
if he or she chooses to exercise their ability to become a member of a for-
eign terrorist group. This is because, from a practical standpoint, once a
citizen becomes a member of a foreign terrorist group, he or she would lose
their ability to advocate independently, and, therefore, any speech that a
citizen made would violate the statute and could be criminally punished.2 30
Also in play here is § 2339B's lack of unlawful intent or purpose re-
quirement which was discussed in Part V.C.1 supra. This part of § 2339B
would allow any speech a citizen makes which violates the statute to be
criminally punished regardless of the intent behind the speech, and it
would further contribute to a citizen forfeiting his freedom of speech when
he becomes a member of a known terrorist organization. Without an un-
lawful intent requirement, after a citizen legally became a member of a
known terrorist group, almost any action made by that citizen in further-
ance of the group and consistent with his or her membership status in the
group could reasonably be criminally punished under the statute.
VI. CONCLUSION
Holder presents a classic case of Congress not being able to control or
punish certain terrorist groups, so Congress decided to try to punish these
groups by proxy. This Note illustrates the problem with using this type of
proxy measure to combat a problem like terrorism. A statute like 18
U.S.C. § 2339B is merely an inconvenience for a terrorist group, while it is
simultaneously a detrimental policy to American citizens because it sets a
precedent that even the most sacred, historical, and fundamental Constitu-
tional rights can be taken away from innocent American citizens at the
desire of Congress.2 3 ' Most deplorable about this type of policy is that
regardless of what embargos or financial constraints that America places
on terrorist groups, those groups who are determined will still find the ways
and means to commit acts of violence. Nothing has demonstrated this
more clearly than the situation with Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the War
on Terror. Unfortunately, a decision such as this is irreconcilable with
228. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) ("person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or con-
spired to provide a foreign terrorist organization with 1 or more individuals (who may be or include
himself) to work under that terrorist organization's direction or control . .").
229. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) ("Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist
organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign
terrorist organization's direction and control.") (emphasis added).
230. See Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2723.
231. The term "innocent" was chosen because by § 2339B's terms Americans may be prosecuted
absent any intention to further or aid the illegal aspects of terrorist groups.
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prior law, offensive to the Constitution, and ineffective at achieving its pur-
pose. For the reasons suggested in this Note, § 2339B needs revision and
clarification to avoid trampling upon one of the most important of individ-
ual rights.
After Holder, it seems as if there is a new category of speech which
should be added to libel, obscenities, and the like, as beyond the scope of
the First Amendment's protection. This category of unprotected speech is
speech materially aiding or supporting a foreign terrorist group.

